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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction for this Appeal pursuant to
§78-2-2(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Article 8, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah.
The Supreme Court may transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
§78-2-2(4) and §78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.
The Utah Supreme Court granted Appellants' Petition For Interlocutory Appeal
in this matter on the 13th day of April, 1992.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
QUESTIONS OF LAW
The questions of law presented for decision upon appeal are as follows:
(1)

Was it error for the trial court to find Lynn Prothero in contempt and

sentence him to jail for acts the court determined to have occurred on July 17, 1991, and
ruled were violations of the Temporary Restraining Order when the record clearly shows
the 10 day restraining order had expired by its own terms on July 8, 1991.
(2) Was it error for the court to find contempt and impose sentence where there
was no specific evidence introduced showing any violation of the Temporary Restraining
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Order during the 10 day term of the its existence from June 28, 1991, at 11:14
a.m. to July 8, 1991, at 11:14 a.m.?
(3) Was it error for the court to find contempt and impose sentence for acts
occurring after the expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order when no motion,
stipulation or court order extended the time of the Temporary Restraining Order to cover
the date of the alleged acts of Lynn Prothero?
(4) Were the due process rights of Lynn Prothero, under the 14th Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, violated where
he was given no prior notice, affidavit or order to show cause or a hearing on a charge
of contempt of court, where the alleged acts did not take place during the effective dates
of the Temporary Restraining Order and did not take place in the presence of the Judge,
where there was no specificity of the allegation of violation of the Temporary Restraining
Order, and where he was given no opportunity to prepare for, respond or to defend
against the allegation that he violated the court order?
(5) Did the court obtain jurisdiction to enter an unconditional order of contempt
where there was no showing of a knowledgeable and willful violation and the order did
not identify any specific acts of contempt and made no provision for an opportunity for
Defendant to remedy or purge himself of the alleged contempt?
(6) Was it error for the court to enter a Permanent Restraining Order before trial
of the case on its merits?
2

(7) Was it error for the court to grant a Permanent Restraining Order where there
was no evidence presented showing irreparable injury or injury that could not be
compensable in damages?
(8) Was it error for the court to grant an injunction without considering the
undue burden upon the Defendants of restriction from their former use of the water for
culinary and stock watering purposes and in light of the trespass and history of
harassment by Mr. Mayers?

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES
All of the foregoing issues for review on this Appeal present questions of law for
determination by the Appellate Court. Although the Findings and Order appealed from do not
denominate separately any findings of fact from conclusions of law, using only the generic
denomination of "Findings and Order", nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal there are very
limited factual disputes.
The standard for review (where the appeal as here presented is essentially on the issues
of law and the interpretation of documents) is that upon review no deference is given to the trial
court's rulings, conclusions or interpretations and the Appellate Court is free to render its
independent interpretation and review for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah
1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Faulkner
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v. Faulkner. 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986); Arnold Machinery Co. v. Balls. 624 P.2d 678 (Utah
1981).
The standard for review on the limited issues of fact which may be incidental to this
appeal is that the Appellate Court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless the
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, the trial court abuses its discretion, the findings
are unsupported by the record, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding or the findings
are otherwise clearly erroneous. Christensen v. Christensen. 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981);
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989); Mees v. Brieham Young University. 639
P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759
P.2d 1162, at 1172 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 65A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as applicable to September 1, 1991):
(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing duration. No
temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the
adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown
by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Every
temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be
endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed
forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define
the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was
granted without notice; and shall expire by its terms within such
time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is
extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the
4

order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer
period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record.
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the
motion for preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at
the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters
except older matters of the same character; and when the motion
comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary
restraining order shall proceed with the application for a
preliminary injunction and, if he does not do so, the court shall
dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice
or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe,
the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or
modification and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and
determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice
require.
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (effective September 1, 1991):
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may
issue only upon a showing by the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the
order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the
party restrained or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be
adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further
litigation.
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Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings.
This is an interlocutory appeal from Findings and Order rendered by Judge Don
V. Tibbs in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah in Civil
No. 9928 entered on the 21st day of November, 1991, in the civil action between Birch Creek
Irrigation Company and its water master, as Plaintiffs, and two of the company's stockholders,
Earl and Lynn Prothero, as Defendants. The case involves a dispute over actions of the water
6

master, Marvin R. Mayers, and water rights of the Defendants. On July 31, 1991, the court
held an evidentiary hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

At that

hearing, the court found Lynn Prothero in contempt of court, sentenced him to serve thirty (30)
days in jail and ruled that Defendants be enjoined. (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991,
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, Lines 16 - 19; Exhibit "A"). Some
sixteen weeks later, the trial judge signed the Findings and Order prepared by counsel for the
Plaintiffs expanding and effectuating those decisions. (Record at 65, Findings and Order;
Exhibit "B").
There has not yet been a trial on the merits of the issues raised by the Complaint of the
Plaintiffs and the Counterclaim of the Defendants.
2. Disposition at the Trial Court.
Counsel for Defendants filed timely objections to the Findings and Order and at
a hearing on January 22, 1992, when the court's attention was called to the fact that there had
been no ruling upon those objections, Judge Tibbs announced that he had previously signed the
Findings and Order. He then ruled "my order stands..." (Record, Trial Setting, Transcript of
Proceedings, January 22, 1992, Page 4, Line 10; Exhibit "C").
The Defendants filed their Petition For Permission to Appeal the Interlocutory
Order on February 11, 1992, and the Utah Supreme Court granted this appeal as prayed on
April 13, 1992.

7

RELEVANT FACTS
On June 27, 1991 Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers, its current water
master and a major stockholder in the irrigation company, filed this suit claiming damages and
seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendants, Earl J.
Prothero and Lynn Prothero (Record at 1, Complaint) The Protheros are stockholders in the
irrigation company and owners of approximately 40 acres of land entitled to be served with
water by the irrigation company and upon which are located their residences and livestock. The
irrigation company owns a small water collection reservoir on land previously taken by
condemnation from the Protheros. (Record at 50, Order of Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D").
That pond is surrounded by the Prothero acreage.
The irrigation company condemnation action to take the land for that small
reservoir commenced in 1977 at which time the irrigation company obtained a Sixth Judicial
District Court Order of Immediate Occupancy, Civil No. 7585 (Record at 50, Order of
Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D"). Prior to the commencement of that condemnation action
Mr. Marvin R. Mayers, who was then, as now, a major stockholder of the Birch Creek
Irrigation Company (but was not then its water master) trespassed upon the Prothero land, cut
gate chains and removed a lock, left the gate open allowing Prothero stock to go free and
threatened Earl Prothero that he, Mayers, was going to force aright-of-wayinto and across the
Prothero property (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, Pages 52 -56). Evidence of those trespass incidents by Mr. Mayers was presented
8

to the court at the 1977 hearing on the irrigation company's Motion for Immediate Occupancy.
The Court granted the order for immediate occupancy in that 1977 action, but as part of the
Order prohibited Mr. Mayers from going upon or working on the Prothero property. The
Court's minute entry states, "Mr. Mayers is not to work on or go on this propertyM (Record at
52, Minute Entry; Exhibit ME") and the Order of Immediate Occupancy specifically prohibited
the Birch Creek Irrigation Company from permitting or bringing Mr. Mayers to the property
(Record at 51, Order of Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D"). The Protheros were present at
the hearing, heard the Judge's ruling, and later obtained a copy of that minute entry. (Record,
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Lines 14 16)
In that former action, the irrigation company later obtained a condemnation order
for taking the land for the pond and an easement in August of 1979. They built the small
reservoir which is enclosed by the remaining Prothero acreage and is near their homes. Since
that time up until the summer of 1991, the company's water masters have been persons other
than Marvin R. Mayers (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, Page 5, Lines 13 to 16; Page 45, Line 11 through Page 46, Line 22).
In April 1991 the irrigation company announced to its stockholders that it was
considering hiring Mr. Mayers to be the water master. The Protheros submitted to the company
a written objection to that action because of their historical problems with Mr. Mayers (Record,
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 46, Lines 6 9

15). Nevertheless, the irrigation company employed Mr. Mayers as its water master for that
summer. On June 9, 1991 Mr. Mayers drove his pickup truck through the Prothero gate and
onto their property.

When he failed to leave upon request from Lynn Prothero and was

traversing the Prothero property on foot to the reservoir site, Lynn Prothero took the ignition
keys and coil wire from the Mayers truck. When Mr. Mayers returned from the pond, Lynn
Prothero told him what he had done and refused to return them to him. He told Mr. Mayers
he had no right to be upon the Prothero property (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing
on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Line 10 - Page 19, Line 10). The prior
trespass and harassment activities of Mr. Mayers on the Prothero property caused Lynn Prothero
concern for his father, Earl Prothero's health because of an existing heart condition. (Record,
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 34, Lines 16 19). He showed him a copy of the minute entry from the condemnation action (Record at 52,
Minute Entry, Exhibit "E") and stated he was impounding the truck as evidence that Mr. Mayers
was violating that Court order (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For
Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Lines 20 - 23). On June 10, 1991 Mr. Mayers returned to
Protheros' gate with another stockholder, Mr. Earl Hobby, who was allowed to inspect the
pond, but Lynn Prothero again told Mr. Mayers not to come on their property.

(Record,

Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 23, Lines 21 22).
On June 27, 1991 Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers filed this action
10

claiming very substantial damages (Record at 1, Complaint). On that same date Plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Record at 24, Motion
For Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction). On June 28, 1991 Judge Louis
G. Tervort signed a Temporary Restraining Order and order for the sheriff to take possession
of the truck (Record at 31, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F"). This was
served upon Earl Prothero June 29, 1991 at which time the truck was returned to Mr. Mayers
(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 25).
That Temporary Restraining Order expired by its own terms 10 days after it was issued, namely
July 8, 1991 at 11:14 a.m. (Record at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit

On July 17, 1991 Mr. Mayers again came to the Prothero property and Lynn
Prothero pointed out that the Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order had expired and told him
not to come onto the property. Lynn offered to check the pond for Mr. Mayers who accepted
the offer. After going to the pond, he reported to Mr. Mayers that the water level was low and
Mr. Mayers left (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, Page 115, Line 22 - Page 117, Line 7).
On July 29, 1991 counsel for the Protheros filed their Answer and Counterclaim
on their behalf claiming they had sustained substantial damages from the acts of both the water
company and Marvin R. Mayers as its water master (Record at 39, Answer and Counterclaim).
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on for hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs
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on July 31, 1991 on a Stipulation and Order for postponement of the original hearing date
(Record at 37, Stipulation For Continuance, and Record at 38, Order; Exhibits "G" and "H").
The Temporary Restraining Order was not extended (Record at 38, Order; Exhibit "H").
Testimony of five witnesses was taken, including the Protheros and Mr. Mayers.

At the

conclusion of the testimony Judge Tibbs ruled from the bench against the Protheros and stated,
among other things, as follows:
I find that they violated the temporary restraining order by
the actions on what Lynn Prothero did by his actions on July 17th.
I find him in contempt of Court and sentence him to 30 days in
jail. I'll hold up putting him in jail until the next hearing of the
Court; but I'll reserve a right to do so upon this Court being
advised of any further interference with the Water Master; ...
Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122,
Lines 16 - 22; Exhibit "A".
In September 1991 the Protheros' attorney, Mr. Dale M. Dorius, who had
represented them up to that point in this case, withdrew as counsel and on September 20, 1991
the undersigned, A. Dean Jeffs, filed his appearance in the action (Record at 61, Motion For
Withdrawal of Counsel and Order, and Record at 63, Appearance of Counsel). The Protheros
had previously ordered from the court reporter a transcript of the July 31, 1991 proceeding and
upon entry in the case the undersigned attorney sent the reporter his own urgent written request
for the transcript to be prepared (Record at 72, Letter, Request For Transcript).
On November 20, 1991, Mr. Berry mailed notice of what he denominated "Notice
of Entry of Findings and Order" (Record at 68, Notice of Entry of Findings and Order; Exhibit
12

"I") along with a copy of the proposed Findings and Order (Record at 65, Findings and Order;
Exhibit "B"). These were received by Defendants' counsel November 21, 1991 and the notice
specified that that "shall be entered as proposed unless you file objections thereto within five (5)
days of receipt of this notice to you" (emphasis added).
The next day, on November 22, 1991, the undersigned mailed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings and Order advising the
Court that the undersigned was not counsel in the case at the time of the July 31st hearing and
that a copy of the transcript of that hearing had been ordered but not yet received (Record at 70
and 72, Motion For Extension of Time to File Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and
Order). On December 12, 1991 Judge Tibbs signed an order granting the Motion extending the
time for objections to be filed "within 30 days." (Record at 73, Order; Exhibit "J"). The
original and copy of that Order was mailed to the office of the undersigned counsel after it was
executed. When counsel's secretary telephoned Carole B. Mellor, the Judge's Court Executive,
to determine why the original was mailed back to counsel after it was executed she was told it
was so the undersigned counsel could prepare the Certificate of Mailing for filing with the
clerk's office and forwarding to opposing counsel. (Record at 73, Order, and Record at 74,
Mailing Certificate). Since the Order was served upon the office of the undersigned by mail and
filed by mail the time for filing was extended to January 14, 1992 under Rule 6(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Order
was filed on January 14, 1992 (Record at 75, Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed
13

Findings and Order).
On January 22, 1992 at a hearing for the purpose of setting a trial date, the
undersigned pointed out to the Court that the Court had not yet ruled on Defendants' Objections
to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Order relating to the July 31, 1991 hearing on the
preliminary injunction. Judge Tibbs announced that he had signed the proposed Findings and
Order before receiving Defendants' objections thereto. He then ruled that the Findings and
Order would stand as signed (Record, Trial Setting, Transcript of Proceedings, Page 4, Line 10;
Record at 90, Clerk Minute Entry; Exhibit "K"). A review of the court file by the undersigned
done immediately after that hearing disclosed to the Defendants' counsel for the first time that
Judge Tibbs had actually signed Plaintiffs' proposed Findings and Order on November 21, 1991,
the same day they and the notice relating to them were received by the undersigned Defendants'
counsel and before expiration of the five (5) days for filing objections as provided in the notice
(Record at 68, Notice of Entry of Findings and Order; Exhibit "I") as well as under Rule 4504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. This was done without any notice to
Defendants' counsel.
The next day, January 23, 1992, after learning the Judge had signed the Findings
and Order before notice to counsel, the undersigned submitted to the Court two alternate
proposed orders, one denying Defendants' objections to the proposed Findings and Order and
the other granting the objections. This was because Judge Tibbs had executed the Findings and
Order before the time given Appellants to object to them and without ruling on the objections.
14

No action was taken on either of the said alternate orders and the Petition For Permission to
Appeal Interlocutory Order was filed in this Court February 11, 1992.
On March 30, 1992, after counsel for Defendants filed the Petition For Permission
to Appeal Interlocutory Order Judge Tibbs held a hearing for argument on Defendants'
objections to the "Findings and Order". Although the Judge stated at that hearing he would set
aside the contempt provisions of the Order he stated he would leave the balance of the Order in
effect. (Record at 101, Clerk Minute Entry). No modification or setting aside of any of the
"Findings and Order" has been entered leaving them in tact and the Temporary Restraining
Order prohibitions in effect including the prohibition against use of water for culinary purposes.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contempt of Court:
The trial court committed significant prejudicial error violative of Defendants rights and
jeopardizing a fair trial on the merits by finding Lynn Prothero in contempt of court and
sentencing him to serve 30 days in jail which should be reversed by this Court.
Point I:
The trial court ruling that actions of Lynn Prothero on July 17, 1991 were done in
contempt of court as a violation of a previously issued Temporary Restraining Order was in
error because the Temporary Restraining Order had expired by its own provisions on July 8,
1991; there was no evidence introduced showing any violation of the order during its applicable
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time from June 28, 1991 to July 8, 1991, and there was no extension of the time of its
application.
Point II:
The elements necessary to a finding of contempt of court of knowledge of what the judge
would require and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply were not present in this case.
There was no evidence to contradict the fact that on July 17, 1991, Lynn Prothero knew the
Temporary Restraining Order had expired and reasonably believed a prior order of the court
prohibiting Mr. Mayers from coming upon the Prothero land applied. Not only is there no
evidence of a violation of the order during the time of its legal existence, there was no showing
of a knowing and willful failure to comply after it expired.
Point III:
The due process rights of Lynn Prothero were violated by the court ruling from the bench
and later signing the order of contempt and jail sentence on allegations of acts not committed
in presence of the court without advanced notice, without being advised of the nature of the
action to be taken against him, without a hearing on the allegation and without a proper
opportunity to defend against the allegation.
Permanent Injunction:
It was error for the court to make and enter a permanent injunction prior to trial.
Point I:
A permanent injunction should be issued only after a full trial on the merits on the broad
16

issues that are the subject of the litigation.
Point II:
The Plaintiffs failed to meet the Utah law requirement of a showing of irreparable injury,
loss or damage for granting injunctive relief.
Point III:
The court failed to consider the need to balance the equities between the parties by failing
to consider the hardship being imposed upon the Defendants by entry of the injunctive relief.'
The irrigation company could have, at little or no expense to it, resolved the problem of Mr.
Mayers entries upon the Prothero property by merely designating some other person to cross the
Prothero land to inspect and regulate the water flow of their pond.

ARGUMENT
THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED
Significant prejudicial error that violated the rights of Defendants resulted from Judge
Tibbs' ruling that:
I find that they violated the Temporary Restraining Order by the
actions on what Lynn Prothero did by his actions on July 17. I
find him in contempt of court and sentence him to 30 days in
jail...
Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122,
Lines 16 - 19; Exhibit "A".
The Judge's later execution of the Findings and Order effectuating that ruling and making
permanent a Temporary Restraining Order which included the prohibition of use of water for
17

culinary purposes, violated due process. If not corrected before trial these errors'will jeopardize
the Defendants' right to a fair and proper trial not only on their defenses to the Complaint but
also on their own counterclaims including their claim to culinary and stock water as filed against
the Plaintiffs in this action.
POINT I
THERE WAS NO CONTEMPT OF COURT BECAUSE THE
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HAD EXPIRED
In the instant case the Temporary Restraining Order that Defendant, Lynn Prothero, has
by order of the trial court been held to have contemptuously violated was a 10 day order issued
by Judge Louis G. Tervort at the outset of the action on June 28, 1991, at 11:14 a.m. That
Order specifically provided: "This Restraining Order shall automatically expire on the 8th day
of July 8, 1991, at the hour of 11:14 a.m." (Record at 31, Temporary Restraining Order and
Order; Exhibit "F").
For the court to find that Lynn Prothero violated the Temporary Restraining Order there
must be evidence showing that he did so between its effective date of June 28, 1991, at 11:14
a.m. and July 8, 1991, at 11:14 a.m. when the Temporary Restraining Order expired.
A review of the Transcript of the testimony in the July 31, 1991 hearing at the conclusion
of which Judge Tibbs made his ruling, reveals that there was no testimony relating to any actions
by Lynn Prothero in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order during the time it was
applicable. No evidence was introduced of any alleged violations of the Temporary Restraining
Order during the period from June 28, 1991, through July 8, 1991. Contrary to Judge Tibbs'
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ruling, Lynn Prothero's actions on July 17, 1991, could not have been done in contempt of court
because there was no Restraining Order to violate on that date. Furthermore, the record is clear
that Lynn Prothero knew when it expired and that there was no willful and knowledgeable failure
or refusal to obey it even on the date of July 17, 1991 (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 116, Lines 9 - 11). There is in the record
no evidence that Lynn Prothero violated the provisions of the Temporary Restraining Order or
that he failed to comply with it during its legal existence.
The time covered by the Temporary Restraining Order was not extended. Rule 65A of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was in force at the time of the signing of the Temporary
Restraining Order, at subparagraph (b) provides as follows:
Every temporary restraining order ... shall expire by its terms
within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court
fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause
shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against
whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a
longer period ... (Emphasis added).
In this action there was no motion, application or stipulation to extend the Temporary
Restraining Order within the time fixed by the Order as required by Rule 65A. There is in the
court file a Stipulation and an Order dated July 17, 1991 (nine days after the expiration of the
Temporary Restraining Order) extending the time for a hearing on Plaintiffs' sought after
preliminary injunction (Record at 37, Stipulation For Continuance and Record at 37, Order;
Exhibits "G" and "H"). But, that stipulation and the order postponing the date for the hearing
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by their very terms made clear that the postponement applied to a hearing on the "Motion For
Preliminary Injunction" not to the already expired Temporary Restraining Order. No reference
is made to the Temporary Restraining Order in either the Stipulation or the Order and they do
not purport to extend the time or application of the Temporary Restraining Order. Furthermore,
by July 17, 1991, the date of the said Stipulation and order, the earlier Temporary Restraining
Order had already expired by its own terms. It could not have been extended on July 17th since
Rule 65 A requires that any extension of a Temporary Restraining Order must be accomplished
during the term of the original Temporary Restraining Order. Nevertheless, the Defendants did
not consent to any extension of the Temporary Restraining Order and the record is clear that it
was not extended.

POINT II
THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT
WERE NOT SATISFIED
Even if the Temporary Restraining Order had not expired before July 17, 1991, the
substantive elements of contempt of court were not proven and do not exist in this case. This
Court set forth the necessary elements for a finding of contempt as they applied in a case
involving failure to comply with court orders in Von Hake v. Thomas in which it stated:
As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply
with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and
intentionally failed or refused to do so... These three elements
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt
proceeding, ... and by clear and convincing evidence in a civil
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contempt proceeding.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988)
This Court in the earlier case of Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977)
pointed out that findings of contempt and sentencing to jail are very serious consequences to the
person involved, stated that contempt must be shown by clear and convincing proof and itemized
those essential elements as:
(1) the party knew what was required of him;
(2) that he had the ability to comply; and
(3) that he willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
The court reaffirmed the elements of this rule in Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 at 1156
(1983).
The record in this case clearly verifies that the elements No. 1 and No. 3 of the rule did
not exist here.
The only testimony relating to actions by Lynn Prothero after the issuance of the
Temporary Restraining Order describe a specific incident on July 17, 1991, nine days after the
expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order. The evidence of the activity on that date was
that Lynn Prothero objected to Mr. Marvin R. Mayers' effort to go across the Prothero property
because he (Lynn Prothero) believed he had a prior and continuing order of this court in the
previous condemnation action that prohibited Mr. Mayers from going upon the premises
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(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 116,
Line 6).
The record does not support that Lynn Prothero knew or should have known that if on
July 17, 1991, he told Mr. Mayers he should not come upon the Prothero property he would be
considered by Judge Tibbs to be violating a court order. Even the testimony of Mr. Mayers at
the hearing confirms Lynn Prothero's understanding that the Temporary Restraining Order had
expired (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction,
Page 116, Lines 9 - 1 1 ) . Not only had the Temporary Restraining Order expired by its own
terms, as pointed out under Point I above, but Lynn Prothero reasonably believed that the
Temporary Restraining Order was no longer in force on July 17, 1991. Furthermore, on that
date Lynn Prothero had no reason to think that a court would at a later date consider his actions
a violation of an expired Temporary Restraining Order.
Even if the Temporary Restraining Order had been in force on July 17, 1991 the
uncontroverted evidence that Lynn Prothero was relying upon the earlier order of this Court
which he understood prohibited Mr. Mayers from coming upon his property and his belief that
the Temporary Restraining Order against the Protheros had expired, would clearly negate any
claims that he "wilfully and knowingly failed and refused" to comply with an order of the Court.
Lynn Prothero's actions on July 17, 1991, could not be construed as done in contempt
of the trial court's Temporary Restraining Order, not only because there was no Restraining
Order on July 17, 1991, for him to violate but also because his actions on that date demonstrate
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that there was no willful and knowledgeable failure or refusal to obey a court order or to harm
the irrigation company. The transcript of the testimony discloses that on July 17, 1991, when
Marvin P. Mayers went upon the Prothero property Lynn Prothero met him and reminded him
that the Temporary Restraining Order had expired and told Mr. Mayers that he was not to come
upon their property.

When Mr. Mayers wanted to check the water level of the pond Lynn

offered to do it for him and Mr. Mayers accepted the offer. After Lynn inspected the pond he
reported that the water level was low, Mr. Mayers left (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991,
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 115, Line 22 through Page 117, Line 7).
While he believed he had the right under the prior court order to keep Mr. Mayers off his land,
this clearly demonstrated his willingness to assist the irrigation company to know the status of
its pond.
Not only is there no record in the proceedings of Lynn Prothero violating the Temporary
Restraining Order during its legal existence, there is no evidence that he knowingly or willfully
refused or failed to comply with it. Thefindingsof contempt and the 30 day jail sentence were
done in error, still hang as a dark cloud over the future proceeding in this case, and should be
ordered vacated by this Court.
POINT HI
DEFENDANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
BY THE ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE
In Von Hake, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Indirect contempt [contempt occurring outside the presence of the
court], in contrast to direct contempt, can properly be adjudged
only in a proceeding more tightly hedged about with procedural
protections. The due process provision of the Federal Constitution
requires that in a prosecution for a contempt not committed in the
presence of the court, "the person charged be advised of the nature
of the action against him [or her], have assistance of counsel, if
requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right
to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf." [Citations omitted]
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1988).
The Motion before the court on July 31, 1991, was Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary
Injunction. Defendant had no notice that the proceedings would also involve a hearing for or
any allegation of contempt of court for violation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued June
28, 1991. There was no advance notice.
There is no mention or allegation of a violation of the Temporary Restraining Order until
near the conclusion of the hearing on July 31, 1991, when Mr. Berry, counsel for Mr. Mayers,
asked Mr. Mayers if there had been any violations of the Temporary Restraining Order. Mr.
Mayers answered that it was his view that when Lynn Prothero told him on July 17, 1991, not
to cross the Prothero property, that this was a violation. The only other mention of a violation
of the Order was Judge Tibbs' statement at the conclusion of the hearing that he found Lynn
Prothero to have violated it by his actions on July 17, 1991 (Record, Transcript of July 31,
1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 115 Line 10 through Page 117 Line
12). There was no other notice, no order to show cause, no setting of a hearing, and no entry
of any charge to prepare Lynn Prothero or his counsel to deal with an allegation of any supposed

24

violation of the Temporary Restraining Order. Certainly the mere self-serving questioning by
his own counsel of one of the Plaintiffs near the end of the hearing did not give the court
jurisdiction to rule and make a finding a few minutes later, at the conclusion of the hearing, that
Lynn Prothero was in contempt of court and to sentencing him to serve 30 days in jail.
Defendant was not in any way "advised of the nature of the action against him". Neither
the court nor counsel implied or expressed in advance that Defendant had been or would be
charged with contempt of court. Defendant's first notice of the charge came at the moment in
which he was found guilty of it (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For
Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, Lines 18 - 19; Exhibit "A"). Such notice does not qualify
as notice at all, and such lack of notice clearly violates the due process rights of Defendants.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Because Lynn Prothero was not aware
that he had been or would be charged with a contempt of court in that very proceeding he was
not able to confront witnesses on the issue of contempt, was unable to prepare a defense on the
issue of contempt, was not given time to produce witnesses, and was not given a proper
opportunity to defend against the allegation. In short, Defendant was found guilty of contempt
of court by the trial court without being afforded the opportunity to prove his innocence. The
court's ruling came as a stunning surprise to the Defendants and their counsel. Such procedure
clearly violates the Utah Supreme Court's admonition that "indirect contempt, ... can properly
be adjudged only in a proceeding more tightly hedged about with procedural protections. Id.
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PERMANENT INJUNCTION SHOULD BE VACATED
POINT I

THE ORDER GRANTING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND MAKING
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PERMANENT SHOULD BE VACATED
The matters ruled on by the court in making and entering the permanent injunction
encompass the very issues to be litigated in this action when it goes to trial on the merits and
were unnecessary in advance of trial. Although when ruling from the bench Judge Tibbs
ordered "that the Protheros shall not take water from the irrigation company now, except under
direction of the water master ...", he did not state the Temporary Restraining Order would be
made permanent. However, some sixteen weeks later when he signed the "Findings and Order"
without any further hearing he specifically made the Temporary Restraining Order permanent
even though there has not yet been a trial of this case on the merits. The "Findings and Order"
states:
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore entered herein and
served upon the Defendants is hereby made permanent and is
incorporated as though fully set forth herein; ...
(Record at 67, Paragraph 12, Findings and Order; Exhibit "B").
It is unusual and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter and make permanent
an order for injunctive relief prior to trial on the merits. To make a previously expired
temporary restraining order permanent prior to a trial of the case on the merits is even more
extreme.
A permanent injunction should issue only after a full trial on the merits at which all of
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the elements essential to the granting of injunctive relief have been resolved in favor of the party
seeking that relief. Atomic Oil Company of Oklahoma. Inc. v. Bardahl Oil Company, 419
F.2nd 1097, 1103 (10th Cir. 1969); Chappell & Co.. Inc. v. Frankel. 367 F.2nd 197, 203
(1966).
Mr. Marvin R. Mayers' truck, which Lynn Prothero had detained upon the Prothero land
had already been returned to him before the evidentiary hearing on the Motion For Preliminary
Injunction was held on July 31, 1991. The Prothero's made it clear by their testimony that,
although they objected to Mr. Mayers coming upon their property because of his prior violations
of their rights and they believed they had a right to make that objection based upon a prior court
order, they were perfectly willing to allow any person other than Mr. Mayers to come to or
cross their property on behalf of the water company (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991,
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 46). The pleadings demonstrate that
various rights of the parties relating to the injunction are the subject of the dispute. The
imposing of the permanent injunctive relief ordered by the court before hearing the whole case
on its merits is not justified.

POINT II
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER DO NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW
The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure applicable to the granting of Temporary Restraining
Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, Rule 65A, was modified effective September 1, 1991. The
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Temporary Restraining Order in this case was filed July 3, 1991, prior to the changes, (Record
at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F") and the Findings and Order were
executed and filed after the change (Record at 67, Paragraph 12, Findings and Order; Exhibit
"B") neither of them met the applicable statutory requirements in effect at the time they were
executed by the court.
The former language of Rule 65 A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the
granting of a Temporary Restraining Order required that:
Every temporary restraining order ... shall define the injury and
state why it is irreparable ... (Emphasis added.)
The Temporary Restraining Order of Judge Tervort, which Judge Tibbs made permanent,
did not do that (Record at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F"). It does
state in its final paragraph at Page 31 "that irreparable injury, loss and damage would be
suffered by Plaintiff..." It says no more than that on the subject. That language clearly does
not define the injury or state why it would be irreparable. Therefore, the original Temporary
Restraining Order failed to meet the requirements set forth in that Rule.
The language of Rule 65A(e) which applied on November 21, 1991, when Judge Tibbs
executed the "Findings and Order" is as follows:
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may
issue only upon a showing by the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the
order or injunction issues;
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(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the
party restrained or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be
adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits which should be subject of further
litigation.
A careful review of the record makes it clear that Plaintiffs made no showing, either by
affidavit or evidence at the hearing, that they would suffer irreparable harm unless the order or
injunction were issued as required by subparagraph (1). Moreover, they did not show, nor even
attempt to show and the judge did not take into consideration that the supposed threatened injury
to Plaintiffs outweigh whatever damage the injunction may cause to the Defendants as required
by subparagraph (2).

POINT III
THE INJUNCTION AS ORDERED IS NOT EQUITABLE
In Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon the Supreme Court expressed the caution with which
a trial court should consider and evaluate a request for an injunction, wherein it said:
Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly
granted ... the discretion of the court should be exercised within
the purview of sound equitable principles, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances of the case.
Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983).
This Supreme Court has also said: "Injunctive relief... is an instrument of equity to be
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invoked where the party has no adequate legal remedy." Anderson v. Granite School District,
17 Utah 2d 405, 407; 413 P.2d 597 (1966).
The Temporary Restraining Order imposed hardship on the Prothero's by prohibiting
them from continuing to use any water for culinary purposes (Records at 29, Temporary
Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F") even though the testimony at the hearing confirmed
that their own filtering and chiorination system was adequate (Record, Transcript of July 31,
1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 28, Lines 13 - 15). Making it
permanent has further extended that hardship.
Furthermore, the Findings and Order were onerously broad in subjecting the Protheros
to the specific control of Mr. Mayers as to all their use of water in spite of his history of
disregard for the property and rights of the Protheros.

The Findings and Order state in

Paragraph 9 as follows:
The Defendants shall
direction and with the
Birch Creek Irrigation
Record at 67, Paragraph 9, Findings

not take or use water except under the
express permission of the water master of
Company; ...
and Order; Exhibit "B".

The right of the Defendants to use water for culinary and stock watering purposes is a
long standing usage and one of the issues to be litigated in the trial of this case on the merits
(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 27,
Lines 2 - 5 ; Page 112, Lines 9 - 13). The Affidavit of Mr. Mayers that was used to obtain the
Temporary Restraining Order and his testimony at trial demonstrate his refusal to recognize that
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claim of right in the Protheros (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For
Preliminary Injunction, Page 112, Lines 9 - 13, and Record at 21, Affidavit of Water Master
Marvin R. Mayers) and the Findings and Order requiring the water master's specific permission
for use of water has interrupted and continues to interrupt that long established usage, even
though the trial court has not yet heard their evidence substantiating that water right. Thereby
the trial court, by the order, delegated to the water master control and the power to prohibit the
Prothero's culinary water usage which is an issue yet to be litigated in the action.

POINT IV
COMPENSABLE DAMAGES ARE NOT IRREPARABLE DAMAGES
In the Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon case, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
The second ground for injunctive relief (irreparable harm) is
generally considered the most important. If the moving party is
unable to show "that the commission or continuance of some act
during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury, ...
the motion for injunction will usually be denied, notwithstanding
a showing of probable right or entitlement to recovery at law.
Irreparable injury, in the injunctive relief context, has been defined
as follows:
Wrongs of repeated and continuing character, or which occasion
damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any
accurate standard, are included ... "Irreparable injury" justifying
an injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in
damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.
Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983) (Emphasis added).
The Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation, by very simple and inexpensive action, can avoid
any problem in serving its need to cross Defendants' property. It is clear, and the company
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officers were aware, that if they would send any person other than Marvin R. Mayers to inspect
or regulate their pond, the Protheros would have no objections and there would be no
confrontations (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, Page 46). It was Marvin R. Mayers that created the problem that gave rise to this
litigation by his former trespasses, his violations of the property rights of the Defendants and
his threats against him. There seems to be no reasonable reason why the water company could
not, as they have done in the past, employ someone other than Marvin R. Mayers to do
whatever required entry upon the property of Defendants. Surely it does not cause irreparable
harm to the water company to do so and if they claim some damage for it, it is a compensable
claim and the Protheros are both property owners and owners of water stock in the company
assuring collectability.
The record in this case is completely void of any proof of irreparable injury beyond
unsupported and unexplained statements in the Complaint and the Affidavit of Mr. Mayers that
immediate and irreparable injury would be suffered by the Plaintiffs if the Temporary
Restraining Order were not granted (Record at 5, Paragraphs 19 and 20; Record at 7, Paragraph
27, Complaint).
Such general and unsupported allegations by Plaintiffs does not constitute a "showing"
that irreparable injury will result if injunction is not granted. There was no substantiation of that
flat assertion by any testimony or evidences.

Without evidence at the hearing for the

Preliminary Injunction on the issue of irreparable injury the court only had before it the
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unsupported general allegations of the Complaint and the Affidavit and therefore no basis for
a determination of irreparable injury. Even supposing damage to crops or livestock were to be
incurred, those are items clearly compensable in monetary damages if proven. There was no
showing of such damages, nor even any assertion that either the irrigation company or Mr.
Mayers would suffer such damage. Based upon the record it would be mere speculation as to
damages to other people. The alleged injuries are not the kind of injuries that would justify an
injunction under Rule 65A(e) and the application of the Rule as it has been applied by this court
and the evidence does not support granting an injunction.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court should reverse and make void the trial court's Findings and Order
that held Lynn Prothero in contempt of court and sentenced him to serve 30 days in jail and that
imposed and made permanent the injunction with its broad and extensive prohibitions and which
included ordering that Temporary Restraining Order be permanent.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this %7%s

of May, 1992.

^V^£*s^-»

A. Dean Jeffs of
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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ADDENDUM

PAGE 122
finds that they cannot r^ly upon it nous because Hv-it's
over;
The t~our*". finds 'hat the Prnlhero^, boththe
father and the son, have blocked the right of u>ay belonging
to the irrigation company; T find they've wrongfully
interfered with the Water Master's duties; I find that they
have wrongfully taken the vehicle and they caused the damage
to Mr. Mayers and to the vrater company.

Tfm gonna

reserve

the ruling on the amount of damage until the time of trial;
I find that they made threats and they assaulted
the Water Master;
I find this, that they diverted water without
right, and the Court reserves jurisdiction to determine the
damages to the other water users of the company, to the
irrigation company, and to the Water Master;
T find that they violated the temporary
restraining order by the actions on what Lynn Prothero did
by his actions on duly 17th.

I find him in contempt of

Court and sentence him to 30 days in jail.

I'll hold up

putting him in jail until the next hearing of the Court; but
I'll reserve a right to do so upon this Court being advised
of any further interference with the Water Master;
It's the order of the Court that the Protheros
shall not take any water from the irrigation company now,
except under the direction of the Water Master;

EXHIBIT—Ei

ril

ANDREW B. BERRY JR. 0903
Attorney for Plaintiffs
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone:
(801) 4 3 6-8 200
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUI& *
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 9928

EARL J PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,

Assigned to:
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Defendants.
ooOoo
This matter came on for regularly scheduled hearing on
the

Plaintiff's

Temporary

Restraining

Order

and

Motion

for

Preliminary Injunction on the 31st day of July, 1991, before the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge.
Plaintiffs
their

and

the Defendants were present

counsel,

respectively.
testimony

Andrew

B.

Berry,

Jr.,

and

and

The

represented by

Dale

M.

Dorius,

The Court, upon the pleadings on file herein, the

of the parties

and

their witnesses, the documentary

evidence admitted and good cause appearing therefore, hereby
FINDS, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

There was no prior restraint against the Plaintiff,

Marvin R. Mayers, from coming upon the Defendant's real property
except during the construction of the pond;

- Cs-

2.
Plaintiff's
property

The

Defendants

blocked

the right of way

of

upon, over the easement over the Defendant's

and

to the pond

the
real

owned by the Plaintiff, Birch Creek

Irrigation Company;
3.

The Defendants have wrongfully interferred with the

Water Master of Birch Creek Irrigation Company, Marvin R. Mayers,
in

the

execution

interferred

with

of
the

his

duties

as

water

master

easements, rights of way,

and

real

have

property

rights and proper functioning of the Plaintiff;
4.

The Defendants wrongfully took possession the motor

vehicle and personal property of the Plaintiffs and deprived them
of said property;
5.

The

Defendants

have

made

threats

of

violence

against the Water Master and physically assaulted him;
6.

The Defendants have taken and converted water of

the Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation Company, and deprived the
Plaintiff thereof without right;
7.

The

Defendant,

Lynn

Prothero,

has

violated

the

Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court by prohibiting
access

to

the

Plaintiff's water

and pond

and

threatening

the

Plaintiff's Water Master;
8.

The

Defendant, Lynn

Prothero, by

virtue

of

the

violation of the Temporary Restraining Order, is in contempt of
this Court's Order and is sentenced to serve thirty (30), days in
the Sanpete County Jail.

This sentence is stayed until the time

of trial herein on condition that there are no further violations
of this Court's Orders;

fiJO

9.

D A,

r

The Defendant's shall take ^or use-fio-water except

under the direction and with the express permission of the Water
Master ot Birch Creek Irrigation Company;
10.

The Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation Company, has

the sole authority to select and appoint it's Water Master;
11.

The Defendants shall not interfere with the duties

of the Water Master, the easements of the Plaintiffs

nor

the

water and other assets of the Plaintiff's;
12.

The Temporary Restraining Order heretofor entered

herein and served upon the Defendants is hereby made permanent
and is incorporated as though fully set forth herein; and
13.
award

This Court

reserves

jurisdiction

the Plaintiff's damages and attorney

to assess and

fees incurred

as a

result of the Defendants wrongful actions.
%/
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V v.
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,

1991

BY THE COURT:

J l , ^
—
DON V T I B B S ,
Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court

^^^^«<L_g^aM^^^>^ertify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true

nf
and ^§^£e($£j:
@^£e(3$£ <<$k0/o\
%^-/°^

t

_
, _
,
,_and
.Order to Dale M
^ l e foregoing
Findings_

Dorius ^'^eSfle'y for Defendants, at P.O. Box U, 29 South Main
Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to'^^Dean Jeffs, Attorney
for Plaintiffs ^^fajT^O North LOO East^iP.O. Bchc 888, Provo, Utah
84603, on this /<\J day o f / / 6/S-^^JCL^I
, 1991

EXHIBIT—C:—
i

j II fiJp.d o n N o v e m b e r 21st. a year ^IUO.
2

MR. JEFFS:

J had not rp.r.v.iK^d a ropy o f thai a n d

3

there w a s d^ o r d e r extending the lime <mc! J submitted if

4

w i t h i n that time.

5

M R . BF.RRY:

J think the objections thai w e r e filed

6

a r n not w o 11 t a k e n .

7

that y o u couldn't find the Protheros tr\ contempt, but it

8

s e e m s io m e u/e w e n t througli many w i t n e s s e s with respect to

9

M r , J e f f s filed a m e m o r a n d u m indjoatiny

I] their a c t i o n s .
THE C O U R T :

10

My point is that m y order s t a n d s .

U'ftM I try t h e c a s e a n d see what happens at that p o i n t .

u

MR. J F F F S :

12

That being the c a s e . Your H o n o r , I d o

W e h a d n o t — ^ l ^ y o u understand, T w a s not t))«

U

need time.

M

Attornev ttt the t i m e .

15 ||

THE COURT:

WP.11.

T understand 51.

}6

M R . -IFFFS:

J x 11 need t jme for di sroi-er v.

17

THE COURT:

okay.

18

M R . .JEFFS:

I'd like 1 2 0 d a y s . Your H o n o r .

How 1ony do you need?
As T

19

s e e t h e w i t n e s s e s a n d read t h e transcript, it seems to m e

20

t h e r e ' s q u i t e a b i t needs t o b e done

21

THE COURT:

Js there any objection?

22

MR. BERRY:

W e l l , (he water company w o u l d like to
O f c o u r s e , If

h e w a n t s io

23

yet the c a s e to t r i a l .

24

d e p o s i t i o n s , we'll m a k e o u r w i t n e s s e s available.

25

THE COURT;

take

Well m y o r d e r — T remember t h e case,

EXHIBIT

Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-3350
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, )
Plaintiff,
V.

)

ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY

)
C i v i l No,

EARL J .

PROTHERO,
Defendant,

7585

)
)

This matter came on for hearing before the above entitled
Court on the 2nd day of November, 1977, before the Honorable
Don V. Tibbs, District Judge; Plaintiff Birch Creek Irrigation
Company being present and represented by counsel, Clark R.
Nielsen of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson and Peck; the Defendant
Earl J. Prothero being present and represented by counsel, M.
Dayle Jeffs of Jeffs and Jeffs; evidence having been adduced
by the respective parties and the matter having been argued and
submitted to the Court and the Court having made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Plaintiff Birch Creek Irrigation Company be permitted and
is hereby given immediate occupancy of the following described
premises upon tender to the Clerk of Sanpete County of the sum
o4. $1,312.50, which amount is 75% of the appraised value of the
following described property located in Sanpete County, State
of Utah, sought to be condemned by Plaintiff for the construction
and maintenance of an irrigation pond and pipeline:
An easement for a water line along the section line with
a width of one rod on each side of said section line
between Sections 18 and 19, Township 14 South, Range 5
East, Salt Lake Meridian, beginning 1320 feet east of the
west corner of the sections and east therefrom a distance
of 880 feet to the point of beginning of the reservoir;
thence south 130 feet, east 210 feet, north 210 feet, west
210 feet and south 80 feet to beginning. The area of the
reservoir is 1.01/ acres.

EXHIBIT—&

EXHIBIT

n

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF

SANPETE

STATE OF UTAH

^

llflta Ndvember 2, 1977

DON V. TIBBS, Judge
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter

Case No.

??85

COUNSEL (Counsel Present):

TITLE (Parties Present)
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

Clark R« Nielsen/'..A^ty^fpj^Pef «
M. Dayle Jeffs, Atty-ftff^Ddf.

V8

EARL J, PROTHERO,
Defendant.
MINUTE ENTRY
Proceedings Before the Court
MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

( ) DIVORCE
( ) O R D E R T O S H O W CAUSE
( ) SUPPLEMENTAL O R D E R
( ) PROBATE
i ) CRIMINAL
( ) ADOPTION
( X) O T H E R

Br. Nielsen filed Affidavit and an Appraisal with Court. Mr. Jeffs
objects to Motion and requests necessity. Mr. Clark Nielsen gave
opening statement briefing the court on this matter. Mr, Jeffs also
made statements. Plf. Exhibit #1 Minutes of Board of Directors1
Meeting Oct. 5f 1977 offerred and received in evidence. Condemnation
Resolution, Exhibit A Is Attached to Complaint. Copy of Condemnation
ftgsnliitlon Fvhi.hifr £? received in pvidence. Mr. Dayle Jeffs crosspxamtned. Mr. George Collflrri called to witness atand by Mr« Jeffs
as an adverse witness. Mr. Earl J. Prothero, defendant, sworn in and
testified. Mr. Nielsen cross-examined. Counsel made their arguments.
Cc1 rt finds thc-re is a necessity and Order of Immediate Occupancy is
•

/

•

_

_

_

_

_

_

—

.

—

_

—

.

—

_

_

_

_

_

_

—

.

granted on the 1 acre and the 2 rods, one on each side of Section 18
and 19. $1,312.50 should b^ paid down at this time being 75% of value.
The Birch Creek Irrigation Company is to construct a chalnlink fence
around pond. If>*. Mayors is not to work or go on this property. Immediate
uccupancy can be taken upon Tenure of $1,312.50.

V£
/ t ^ -.c AJA
,s

.

,

Court Clerk

Don V. Tibbs, District Judge
- 103

m

I EXHi6iT-£—
I
™__„
I

ANDREW B . BERRY, J R .

Attorney for
62 W e s t Main
P . O . Box 600
Moroni, Utah
Telephone:

0309

nLED

Plaintiffs
Street

,(rrTCA1 - .- • M
Dl ^ L
_(_ , „
r

84646-0600
(801) 4 3 6 - 8 2 0 0

- .-MJ-JTY UTAH
Q PR 4 T l
o in
.
n.cyiMlSEM

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS^CT^COTRTJTOl&EWJWETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND ORDER

BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No.

vs.
EARL J. PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,

Assigned to:
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Defendants.
ooOoo
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Based
Plaintiff,

upon

Marvin

Plaintiff's

R.

Mayers,

Complaint, Affidavit of

and

the

Water

Master

of

the
the

Plaintiff and Motion for Order and Temporary Restraining Order,
and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The

Defendants,

Prothero, are temporarily
from

in any manner

Earl

J.

Prothero

and

Lynn

restrained, enjoined and prohibited

interfering with the duties of the Water

Master, diverting water to their own use without authorization,
using irrigation water as cullinary water, opening and closing
water gates and lines without authorization, digging ditches and
creating

other barriers to prevent ingress and egress to the

water company ponds, ditches and lines and otherwise interfering
/ yf
^ervea 10: . t - ^ ^ ^ ' '^?K7'HK.fl F
^ *
/ y.
Served to: ^ ^ & Fil^rA-elfi
J^t A

with the easements and rights of way of the Plaintiff, Birch
Creek Irrigation Company;
2.

The

Defendants,

Prothero, are temporarily

Earl

J.

Prothero

restrained, enjoined

and

Lynn

and prohibited

from harrassing, annoying, injuring, threatening, striking and
assaulting

the Water Master

and other Birch Creek

Company

employees and preventing

Master

from

preventing

servicing

ingress

the

and

the water company and Water

ponds,

egress

Irrigation

to,

lines
from

and
and

ditches

upon

and

the

real

and

Lynn

property of the Defendants;
3.

The

Defendants,

Earl

J.

Prothero

Prothero, are temporarily

restrained, enjoined

and prohibited

from and against damaging

the motor vehicle, keys, tools and

other personal property of the Plaintiffs;
4.

The Sheriff of Sanpete County is ordered to take

possession of said Plaintiff's motor vehicle, keys, tools and
other

personal

property

immediately

and

deliver

the

said

property to the Plaintiffs until a hearing may be held upon the
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; and
5.

The Defendants are ordered to forthwith cease and

desist from their unauthorized use of the Plaintiff's water.
This

Temporary

Restraining

Order

has

been

issued

without prior notice to the Defendants, for the reason that this
Court

has

determined,

on

the

basis

of

Plaintiff's

Verified

Complaint, Affidavit and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
copies of which are served upon the Defendants with this Order,

that irreparable injury, loss and damage would be suffered by
Plaintiff before notice could be served and a hearing scheduled.
This Temporary Restraining Order shall automatically
expire on the

X

da

Y of

W;/RfljUXs's

, 1991, at the hour of

ll-'l<f A- m.
DATED this

day of June, 1991, at the hour of

J/^j-A-

m.
BY THE COURT:

S M I •WiM
'*

\%

EXHIBIT - £ L _ I

Fli.£0
SAVF"

7 -

r

91 JUL 19
DALE M . OORIUS #0903
Attorney for:
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City. Utah 84302
723-5219

RIC-i.'
CLERK
BY

' •'•>jT

:. UTAH

pn 4 04
T' *•>

TIANSEN

- T ^ ^ ^ I ^ M P U T Y

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

STIPULATION
FOR
CONTINUANCE

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 9928
vs,
Judge Don V. Tibbs
EARL J- PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,
Defendants•

COMES NOW

Plaintiffs by

and through their attorney, ANDREW

B. BERRY, and Defendants by and
DORIUS, and

through their

attorney, DALE M.

stipulate that the Hearing on Plaintiffs1 Motion for

Preliminary Injunction scheduled for the 17th day of
at 10:00
That said

a.nu, may

be continued

continuance is

Defendants is

for the

scheduled for

July, 1991

to the 31st day of July, 1991.
reason that

the attorney for

a two-day trial in Salt Lake County

on the 16th and 17th of July.
DATED\this

//

day of July, 1991,

ANDREW B. BERRY
attorney for Plaintiffs

DALE H- DORIUS
Attorney for Defendants

EXHIB/T _ J 4 _ /

FILED

s,*\'r^

-ifirw

UTAH

-1-' >M- 19 PH 12 37

DALE M . DORIUS #0903
Attorney for:
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City. Utah 84302
723-5219

K ;

! :

• • -

• IS.IANSEP,

CLERK
8Y

-^-^^^rOEPUTY

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

]
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
I

Civil No. 9928

1

Judge Don V. Tibbs

vs.
EARL J. PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,

]

Defendants.

That upon

the parties stipulation and good cause appearing,

it is hereby ORDERED, that the Hearing on
Preliminary Injunction

scheduled for

Plaintiffs' Motion for

the 17th day of July, 1991

at 10:00 a.m., may be continued to the 31st day of July, 1991.

/d
DATED this / 7 ^ d a y of July, 1991.

:

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 600
62 West Main Street
Moroni, Utah 84646
Telephone: (801) 43 6-8 20 0

'""~

TILED
"X'T

UTAH

- ^ : i J 2 1 API 2 5 5
- ' ~f!ANSEf:

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

NOTICE OF ENTRY
OF FINDINGS AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Civil No. 9928

EARL J. PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,

Assigned t o :
H o n o r a b l e Don V. T i b b s

Defendants.
ooOoo
TO THE DEFENDANTS EARL J. PROTHERO AND LYNN PROTHERO
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the provisions
of the Rules of Practice and Rules Civil Proceedure that the
Findings and Order mailed to you on the /sFj
1991,

shall be entered

thereto within

five

as proposed

day of November,

unless you file objections

(5) days of the receipt of this notice to

you.
DATED this C^f)

day /ft

NovemberX 1991.

'ANDREW B.VBERRY, JR.
Attorney for Plainti^ffls

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Entry of Findings and
Order to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, at P.O, Box U,
29 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302, an£ to' A. Dean
Jeffs, Attorney for Plaintiffs, ^p^^^oocth
100 ^as^, P.O,4 Box
888, Provo, Utah 84603, on this
1991.

i EXHiBST

A.-,.-

FILC0

I

'.. L-

A. DEAN JEFFS, #1653
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law
Attorney for Defendants
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

llUJLK&W

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
EARL J. PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,
Defendants.

Civil No. 9928
Judge Don V. Tibbs

BASED UPON Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Objection to Plaintiffs'
Proposed Findings and Order filed in the above-entitled Court on or about November 22, 1991,
and with good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings to be filed tcnnflO) day3 after the Ukmuipt
procee4mgs-afe-delivered to Defendants' counsel is hereby granted.
DATED and s ^ ^ \ l ^ l S ™ ! k D p D e c ^ r n b ^ ^ 1991.
BY THE COURT:

of^

I

EXHIBIT-^

District Court, S t a t e of U t a h
SANPETE

^cM-r
OFPART M
ENT

MANTI

r.OIINTY

CALENDAR
MINUTE ENTRY
TAPE L 0 G

Zase No.
rv-QQ?fl

BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and
MARVIN R. MAYERS,

Tape No.

)ate
.1 AM 11, 1992
Time
1 0 : 0 0 A.M.
Proceeding

Plaintiff

Appeared:

TO SET A
ANDREW B. BERRY, J R . ,
TRIAL
Appeared:
Judge DV^IerkGPS Attorney
Counter
lumber

MINUTE

3pfJ

ENTRY

Jl^tlrt^L/^Lf

Vh\jljiA

QjA.

A, DEAN JEFFS
Attorney

Appeared:

MINUTE

X

ENTRY

4Q\fyyuj/ipI^
/U tkJ]

JUL

j+m
W&M

Jm&t

4\4L.

tMi4i*LL&
My//^/J xxm

^fiuA.^tr^

hi/uiut

il^JhtfJuj -

hi

VfULtdo )<A& C$SLu^
JJH/J

^JdJub A?7

p? ALUL
^2//X C/txZA ~&*u/
~YW\
-JHLjytxkJb
^LLL
UL l^JUAl
^L

Appeared:

.Jhujj,-

7Y1A.
'Al

Defendant

(LM^JLLrtSsfiCf

frbJfr
s2u+
x^m.Q-^

%

K

EARL J . PROTHERO and
LYNN PROTHERO,

Counter
Number

Cdi^^^Jniu^^cL
*,

V S.

OJJJUMJ

JtjAsAuAJ,.

JJJJ^TUrni±

torn

jr*< }^%
'. /|>71-

